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A standard reading of Anscombe’s “The First Person” takes her to ar-
gue, via reductio, that ‘I’ must be radically non-referring. Allegedly, she 
analogizes ‘I’ to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It is raining’. Hence nothing need 
be said about Anscombe’s understanding of “the referential functioning 
of ‘I’”, there being no such thing. We think that this radical reading is 
incorrect. Given this, a pressing question arises: How does ‘I’ refer for 
Anscombe, and what sort of thing do users of ‘I’ refer to? We present a 
tentative answer which is both consistent with much of what Anscombe 
says, and is also empirically/philosophically defensible. 
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1. Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to extract a novel reading from G. E. M. Ans-
combe’s classic paper “The First Person” and to defend the view that 
we take her to hold. This is no easy feat, since much has been written 
about that paper—and much of that has been negative. But we believe 
that there is an overlooked reading of “The First Person” that is both 
1 A fi rst draft of this paper was presented at the Department of Philosophy, 
Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile, May 24, 2017. A revised version was 
given at the Annual Conference on Philosophy and Linguistics, Inter-University 
Center, Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 5, 2017; to the School of Philosophy, 
Australian National University, November 2, 2017; to the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Reading, January 19, 2018; and to the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Manchester, May 22, 2018. We are grateful to audience members 
at these venues for very helpful feedback. Thanks also to Brian Garrett, Jennifer 
Hornsby, Léa Salje and Barry Smith for very pleasant mealtime discussions of 
Anscombe’s views, and to Lenny Clapp, Rick Grush, Michael Hymers, Rockney 
Jacobson, Angela Mendelovici, Martin Montminy, and Eliot Michaelson for written 
comments. Financial support was provided by The Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada and by a Visiting Fellowship from the Research School 
of Science Sciences at the Australian National University.
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consistent with much of what Anscombe says there and elsewhere and 
empirically/philosophically defensible.
First some stage-setting. There is a fairly standard reading in the 
literature on “The First Person” according to which Anscombe is argu-
ing that the fi rst-person pronoun ‘I’ is radically non-referring. On this 
“Straight” reading, far from functioning logically as a proper name, ‘I’ 
is instead, for Anscombe, similar to the syntactically expletive use of 
‘it’ in ‘It is raining’. So read, her core argument is that ‘I’ must be non-
referring since otherwise we arrive at a metaphysical view such that 
something like a Cartesian ego exists and is the referent of tokens of 
‘I’. And according to Anscombe, that view is borderline nonsensical. 
Philosophers who read “The First Person” in this way include Clarke 
(1978), Evans (1982), Garrett (1994, 1997), Hamilton (1991), Hinton 
(2008), Kripke (2011), Peacock (2008), Taschek (1985), Teichmann 
(2008), Wiseman (2018) and van Inwagen (2001).2
In a recent paper, one of us has defended a revisionist alternative 
to this Straight reading of “The First Person” (Stainton 2018). Goes the 
idea, Anscombe can be seen to be making at least three points. The fi rst 
is that ‘I’ doesn’t behave like a proper name as proper names were un-
derstood at the time. The second point, as we in 2018 might phrase it, is 
that in one historically specifi c sense of ‘refer’, ‘I’ doesn’t “refer”. Rather, 
‘I’ can be used to “speak of” something (47); to “concern an object” (61 
and 63); and to “specify” an object (47).3 The third is that when thinking 
about ‘I’, we should not be misled by surface grammar. For while ‘It is 
raining’ has a surface-subject term, in that context ‘it’ is non-referring 
(on every construal of ‘refer’), and contributes nothing to the sentence’s 
meaning.
Our question begins where this revisionist account leaves off. In 
short: if the Straight reading of “The First Person” is rejected, how on 
Anscombe’s view does ‘I’ manage to “speak of”, “specify” or “concern” 
things in the world? And what does one “speak of” when using ‘I’? To 
put it deliberately vaguely for now, so as not to beg any questions, our 
focus will be: What, to use her phrase, is the “mode of meaning” of ‘I’ 
for Anscombe (55)?
2 One example: “Professor Anscombe’s position is that it is not the function of 
the word ‘I’ to refer; the word is thus unlike ‘the present kind of France’, which is 
in the denoting business but is a failure at it; rather, the word, despite the fact that 
it can be the subject of a verb or (usually in its objective-case guise, ‘me’) the object 
of a verb, is not in the denoting business at all… for Anscombe, the word ‘I’ refers 
to nothing in a way more like the way in which ‘if’ and ‘however’ refer to nothing” 
(van Inwagen 2001: 6). Reading Anscombe in this (standard, widespread) fashion, 
van Inwagen takes her view to be easily refuted: e.g., by the logical validity, due 
to transitivity of identity, of ‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe; Elizabeth Anscombe is the 
author of Intention; therefore, I am the author of Intention’. To our minds, the utter 
obviousness of such an objection shows that this cannot really have been Anscombe’s 
position on ‘I’.
3 Unless otherwise noted, all in-text citations are to Anscombe (1975).
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One might be excused for wondering: Why expend so much time 
reconstructing, from Anscombe’s text and from her larger body of phil-
osophical work, a positive story about ‘I’? In other words, why Ans-
combe? And why “The First Person”? Our motivation involves a mix 
of the historical and the substantive. The historical motivation is that 
such a reconstruction encourages renewed engagement with her ex-
tremely original and important work on language and mind. Anscombe 
is surely one of the greatest philosophical minds of the 20th Century, 
whose work on action theory and ethics is foundational for entire sub-
fi elds. As a result, her oeuvre surely merits the same scholarly respect 
as that devoted to many of her male peers in the Analytic tradition, 
such as Austin, Davidson, Dummett, Grice, and Strawson. And one 
way to illustrate the importance of Anscombe’s work in mind and lan-
guage is by engaging directly with this underappreciated paper of hers, 
one that has spawned a huge literature and is jam-packed with in-
sights—albeit ones often denigrated as fruitful ideas that appear in the 
context of a not-very-convincing paper.
Those are our historical motivations. Substantively, we fi nd in “The 
First Person” an initially promising view about the semantics of the 
fi rst-person pronoun ‘I’—one worthy of further development quite inde-
pendently of Anscombe’s historical standing in the fi eld. In short, even 
if Anscombe were not one of the founders of the Analytic tradition, her 
insights and arguments in “The First Person” would still be worth tak-
ing seriously.
So much by way of stage-setting; here is our plan going forward. 
We begin with methodological remarks. Next, we explicate some Ans-
combean observations about ‘I’ that any successful account of its “mode 
of meaning” must accommodate. We then present our positive view: 
in particular, we will attribute to Anscombe the insight that ‘I’ has 
(what we call) a “defl ated reference”. We then argue that this view is 
plausible both as a tentative piece of Anscombe exegesis as well as a 
substantive proposal about the syntax and semantics of ‘I’. We conclude 
with some objections and replies.
2. Methodological Preliminaries
Our twin motivations lead us to adopt a certain methodological ap-
proach: a sort of history of philosophy that lies between two poles. It is 
not philosophy-focused history nor is it historically-inspired philosophi-
cal problem solving. Our neither-fi sh-nor-fowl methodology yields twin 
criteria for success. First, the better our reconstruction fi ts with the 
text and with the author’s larger corpus and philosophical milieu, the 
better the reconstruction. Second, the more promising the reconstruc-
tion is qua substantive account of the phenomenon, the better it is. 
These two criteria are potentially confl icting. One would like to be 
charitable to the author, but one doesn’t want to be too charitable. Great 
philosophers get things wrong and we certainly acknowledge that Ans-
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combe’s work, both in “The First Person” and elsewhere, is imperfect: 
her writing style is often obscure and she is sometimes too dismissive of 
opposing or confl icting views. Relatedly, a “perfectly charitable” read-
ing threatens to be anachronistic. So, our approach requires balancing 
out “what Anscombe really thought in the early 1970s” against “what 
we can learn from her about our present-day issues.”
Putting a positive spin on this diffi cult balancing act, both poles 
stand to benefi t from a satisfying answer to our target question; it could 
provide a useful departure point for each. It would also provide indirect 
support for the conclusion of the companion negative paper mentioned 
above: that Anscombe eschews the radical non-referring view becomes 
all the more plausible if our hypotheses herein are on the right track.
3. Anscombe on ‘I’
Moving beyond methodological commitments, we turn to some core ele-
ments of “The First Person”. Anscombe’s free-fl owing style resists regi-
mentation, but many authors would agree that her positive remarks 
about the way ‘I’ functions can be distilled into a handful of observa-
tions.
Observation #1: Immunity to Certain Errors 
According to Anscombe, ‘I’ seems to be immune to reference failure: 
“If ‘I’ is a name, it cannot be an empty name” (55). ‘I’ appears equally 
immune to a certain kind of error regarding mistaken identifi cation: 
“Guaranteed reference [in this latter sense] would entail a guarantee, 
not just that there is such a thing as X, but also that what I take to be 
X is X (57). Or again: “[The ‘I’-user cannot] take the wrong object to be 
the object he means by ‘I’” (57). Here is an example designed to support 
those generalizations:
Rob: I am smoking
Andrew: #You’re right that someone is smoking, but the person you 
intended by ‘I’ is actually Juanita, not Rob
‘I’ in the fi rst sentence cannot fail to refer. (Or so it seems. The point 
will be revisited below.) This contrasts with, for example, the expres-
sion ‘The man with the hat’ in ‘The man with the hat is smoking’. A 
speaker, say Rob Stainton, could use it when looking at what is in fact 
a trick of the light, and thereby fail to refer to anything. More intrigu-
ingly, the absurdity of the second sentence highlights that a speaker 
cannot wish to refer to one thing with ‘I’ and yet somehow end up refer-
ring to something else. Again, contrast ‘The man with the hat is smok-
ing’. It is perfectly possible for Rob Stainton to use it to pick out, and 
talk about, a woman with a large, geometrical hairdo; and a perfectly 
sensible reply could be ‘You’re right that someone is smoking, but the 
person you intended by ‘The man with the hat’ is actually a woman 
with a curious head of hair’.
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To come at the point another way, ‘I’/‘myself’ seems to have an “indi-
rect refl exive” use such that I spoke of myself, but I didn’t know it is not 
possible. On that use, someone saying ‘I’ cannot misidentify the refer-
ent—so, such a confusion cannot arise. Here again, this is to be sharply 
contrasted with the “direct refl exive” in ‘When I spoke of the man with 
the hat, I spoke of myself, but didn’t know it’, where such misidentifi ca-
tion is perfectly possible.
Observation #2: Immunity to Doubt
The foregoing facts about immunity-to-referential-error also yield epis-
temological consequences. Though I (that is, Rob Stainton) can doubt 
whether Rob Stainton exists, thinks, and so on, I cannot doubt whether 
I exist, think, and so on. Relatedly, while I can doubt whether I (that is, 
Rob Stainton) am Rob Stainton, I cannot doubt (in the “indirect refl ex-
ive” use) whether I am me. So ‘I’-talk seems to rule out certain skeptical 
worries.
Observation #3: Bodily Properties
A third Anscombean observation is that if ‘I’ refers, then one can con-
ceive of it doing so in the absence of a body altogether, or indeed in the 
absence of any bodily sensations. In support of this view, Anscombe 
introduces a much-discussed Tank Thought Experiment: in an imag-
ined situation of utter sensory deprivation, urges Anscombe, a person 
can still think: ‘I won’t let this happen again’ (58). To support the same 
conclusion, she proposes a Body-As-Puppet Thought Experiment. The 
following sentence, suggests Anscombe, could be used and understood 
in a conceivable conversation: ‘When I say ‘I’, that does not mean this 
human being who is making the noise. I am someone else who has bor-
rowed this human being to speak through’ (60). Here, it does seem that 
what ‘I’ would refer to need not be any kind of physical body.
Observation #4: Perception and Action
Finally, the observation that, say, the man in the hat is in danger 
(where the man in the hat is, as a matter of fact, Andrew Botterell) 
can have quite different action-generating effects than the observation 
that I (that is, Andrew Botterell) am in danger. Closely related to this, 
‘I’ can be used to express an intention to act in a certain way. This 
is very different from using ‘I’ to make empirically-based predictions 
about how a certain body (for example, that of Andrew Botterell) will 
behave in the future (56).
By way of summary, contrast the name ‘René Descartes’. It lacks 
many of the foregoing features. For example, the following discourse 
makes perfect sense:
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Rob: René Descartes is smoking.
Andrew: You’re right that someone is smoking, but the person you 
intended by ‘René Descartes’ is actually Baruch Spinoza, not René 
Descartes.
This shows that proper names are not immune to certain sorts of ref-
erence-errors. The same can be said about immunity to doubt: while 
René can doubt whether he is René Descartes, he cannot doubt that he 
is himself (in the “indirect refl exive” sense).
Moreover, as we read her, Anscombe would disagree that ‘René 
Descartes’ might refer to a disembodied soul or Cartesian ego. As we 
will discuss below, Anscombe thinks that it’s built into the meaning of 
‘Chicago’ that it refers to a city; similarly, it’s built into the meaning of 
‘René Descartes’ that it refers to some sort of embodied animal, specifi -
cally a human male.4 Finally, the action-generating effects of ‘René is 
in danger’ are comparable to those of ‘The man in the hat is in danger’; 
they aren’t like those of ‘I am in danger’.
In addition to these four positive observations, “The First Person” 
contains several negative points about how not to account for them. 
First, Anscombe notes that attributing to ‘I’ a special “descriptive 
sense” (in the Frege-inspired sense) won’t do the trick. This holds even 
if what is proposed is a sense that is merely envisioned by the speaker: 
e.g., a sortal intended by the speaker to fi x the referent of the bare 
demonstrative ‘this’. In particular, according to Anscombe, one must 
not assign a descriptive sense to ‘I’ that would lead to a Descartes-type 
mentalistic “self” being the referent of ‘I’, such that: I have infallible 
knowledge of that mental “self”; aspects of it are “private” in that only I 
can have knowledge of those; and the “self” is made of some queer non-
bodily substance that explains these properties. Anscombe also warns 
that one should not attempt to ensure guaranteed reference by having 
the pronoun pick out only the me-right-this-instant. Rather, ‘I’ must be 
capable of specifying entities that have a temporal extension.
It is on the basis of these arguments and observations that Ans-
combe (in)famously concludes with the seemingly extraordinary claims 
that have animated the Straight reading:
(i) Logically speaking, ‘I’ is not a name (53 and 56);
(ii)  I’ does not involve singular reference (53);
(iii) ‘I’ does not refer to the ‘I’-user (56):
(iv) ‘I’ is not a singular term whose role is to make a reference (56 
and 58);
4 To anticipate, this may prove one part of the reason why, in Anscombe’s view, 
‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ is not an identity proposition: we will urge that, for her, 
‘I’ specifi es a person in the forensic sense; and that person is (as one might variously 
put it) merely connected with/realized by/composed of a living human male body. If 
the person-qua-moral-agent and her body are not one and the same thing then (even 
though ‘I’ is used to “speak of” things, hence not an expletive), Anscombe’s infamous 
claim about ‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ looks reasonable.
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(v) ‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical 
role is to make a reference, at all (60)
4. On ‘Referring’ 
Recall our deliberately vague target question: What, according to Ans-
combe, is the “mode of meaning” of ‘I’? How might we go about an-
swering this question? We think it is best to proceed in stages. First, 
recognize that it is only “infl ated” reference that is being rejected by 
Anscombe. Second, identify an alternative that fi ts better with her text 
and larger philosophy.
To begin with, it is clear that the then-current Frege-inspired con-
ception of reference builds in a great deal. It requires that proper names 
have a descriptive sense that is synonymous with a defi nite descrip-
tion. Empty names aside, that sense fi xes a substantial objective thing 
as the referent of a name.5 It also licenses various a priori entailments 
and analytic necessities (e.g., the descriptive sense of ‘Chicago’ a priori 
entails that it is a city; and this is, as a matter of meaning, a necessary 
feature of Chicago). To elaborate with a notorious example, assuming 
‘Hesperus’ has as its descriptive content fi rst heavenly body visible at 
night, this descriptive content would simultaneously fi x the referent as 
Venus and make the name synonymous with the noun phrase ‘The fi rst 
heavenly body visible at night’. As a result, it will be analytic that Hes-
perus is a heavenly body; anyone who knows the meaning of the name 
will know a priori that this is the case; and the heavenly-body status 
will be necessary. Reference (of this “infl ated” variety) also requires, 
second, that the speaker intend a descriptive content (56): typically, 
this will coincide with the descriptive content of the term, although 
the speaker may unwittingly intend a different content, thereby fi x-
ing a different “speaker’s referent”. Turning now from the reference 
relation to the thing referred to, an “infl ated referent” must, third, be 
a “distinctly identifi able”/“distinctively conceived subject” (65) having 
clear identity conditions (53). Finally, the required descriptive content 
and the required “objective/robust” nominatum jointly explain not just 
epistemological and metaphysical features of the term, but also psycho-
logical ones: e.g., that perfectly rational agents can fail to realize that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus is explained thereby.
5 Textual evidence that Anscombe demands a conception/sense for “name-like 
words” and for “reference” (as she uses those terms), includes: “We seem to need a 
sense to be specifi ed for this quasi-name ‘I’. To repeat the Frege point: we haven’t 
got this sense just by being told which object a man will be speaking of, whether 
he knows it or not, when he says ‘I’… [If] ‘I’ expresses a way its object is reached 
by him, what Frege called an “Art des Gegebensein”, we want to know what that 
way is and how it comes about that the only object reached in that way by anyone is 
identical with himself” (48), Also: “The use of a name for an object is connected with 
a conception of that object. And so we are driven to look for something that, for each 
‘I’-user, will be the conception related to the supposed name ‘I’...” (51–52).
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 On the view that we are extracting from “The First Person”, ‘I’ does 
not exhibit reference of this “infl ated” sort. ‘I’ has instead only a “de-
fl ated reference”, in at least three senses: a defl ated referring relation, 
a defl ated referent, and a defl ated psycho-philosophical explanatory 
burden. Let us unpack these, each time taking philosophically inspira-
tion from other authors.
A. Defl ated Referring Relation
To explain what we have in mind when we talk about ‘I’ having a de-
fl ated referring relation, we borrow from David Kaplan’s work on “pure 
indexicals”. According to Kaplan (1989), such terms have no descrip-
tive sense associated with them. Rather, they obey a rule-of-use that 
outputs an object given a context of utterance. Importantly for our pur-
poses, pure indexicals (including ‘I’) don’t invoke the intentions of the 
speaker. Anscombe herself phrases the rule-of-use for ‘I’ thus: “If X 
makes assertions with ‘I’ as subject, then those assertions will be true 
if and only if the predicates used thus assertively are true of X” (55).6
B. Defl ated Referent
The rule-of-use proposed above requires that there be something that 
a token of ‘I’ concerns or specifi es. Critically, the rule does not itself fi x 
whether that something is a soul, a mental substance, a body, etc. It 
merely says that the thing-asserting, whatever it be, is what will make 
the assertion true or false. As we read Anscombe, it will be facts about 
our world that settle which things turn out to be assertion-makers 
hereabouts.
Anscombe clearly does not believe that assertion-makers are chunks 
of Cartesian inner mental substance. She eschews any such thing as 
nonsensical. But then what can be the defl ated alternative? What else, 
for her, can stand in for X?
We can fi nd something suitably Anscombean if we move away from a 
preoccupation with a Descartes-inspired mentalistic “self” and towards 
something very different. An important kindred spirit, we think, is Pe-
ter Strawson (1953, 1959, 1966). According to him, and putting things 
crudely, there is a gradient among “individuals” running from the most 
primitive proto-individuals with mere feature-placing (e.g., raining or 
smelling foul hereabouts) to the most robust—countable, clearly indi-
viduated, self-standing, and explanatory objects (e.g., the dog Fido). 
Crucially for the positive view that we are reconstructing, and conso-
nant with Anscombe’s philosophical foci, along this continuum there 
can be individuals that are a (mere?) locus of ethical evaluation and 
6 More cautiously, and as Anscombe herself explicitly recognized in her Post 
Scriptum at p. 65, because of the existence of “oblique” contexts this proposed rule-
of-use for ‘I’ would need to be revised somewhat. It should read something like: ‘…
those assertions will ordinarily be true if and only if…’. Oblique contexts would then 
be treated as non-ordinary exceptions. More on this below.
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intentional action: persons in the “offenses against the person” sense, 
to use Anscombe’s well-fi tted phrase (61). So understood, persons are 
very unlike the philosopher’s mind-internal “selves”: persons are not 
distinctly identifi able subjects whose queer nature (causally) explains 
the emergence of normatively evaluable actions. Nonetheless, we are 
suggesting that they are (intersubjectively observable) “objects” that 
one can straightforwardly talk about—indeed, in the usual case, the 
sorts of things that exhibit the features of ethical evaluation and ratio-
nal action are, for Anscombe, living human bodies (61).
A related insight can be found in Amie Thomasson’s writings (see, 
e.g., her 2010). An important line of thought therein is that the ontolog-
ical scruples of Quine (1948)—which require precise individuation con-
ditions, reducibility to the physical sciences, etc., before something can 
be counted as a genuine object—are overly demanding. To the contrary, 
many perfectly respectable entities fail to meet such arch conditions: 
silences, holes, storms, academic disciplines, Nominalism, folk songs, 
and so on. These too would all be, in our sense, “defl ated referents”. 
These ideas apply to “The First Person” in the following way: a refer-
ent for ‘I’ need not have precise identity conditions. Instead, what it is 
for there to be an individual, “the person”, for which the fi rst-person 
personal pronoun ‘I’ can stand, is merely for there to be something-
or-other that acts rationally, and that is subject to normative evalua-
tion. Relatedly, to demand that the existence of persons, in this forensic 
sense, explains how there come to be normatively evaluable actions 
gets things the wrong way around. (Compare: “Rules are prior to and 
explain behavioral patterns and (in)correctness”. No, says the Wittgen-
steinian, it is because there are behavioral patterns and (in)correctness 
that it’s proper to recognize a rule.)
One should identify the referential locus of ‘I’ as the person, foren-
sically understood, not merely because of persons’ centrality to action 
theory and ethics, but also because, as Anscombe says, “only thoughts 
of actions, postures, movements and intended actions… are unmedi-
ated and non-observational” (63). Coming at things this way, one can 
take Anscombe’s unmediated access comments seriously, but without 
positing a “distinctly conceived subject” with mysterious causal power 
that achieve such access—because such access is constitutive of Ans-
combean persons. Put metaphorically, the person provides a kind of 
“bridge” between the word ‘I’ and unmediated access: ‘I’ is connected 
to persons, as per our “defl ated referent” story; persons, for Anscombe, 
are inherently connected to thoughts of actions and intentions; which 
thoughts are connected, for her, in an unmediated way to movements, 
postures, etc.
C. Defl ated Explanatory Burden
We have argued that, for Anscombe, ‘I’ is associated with a defl ated 
reference relation, and that the kind of things that ‘I’ in fact tends to 
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specify, at a context, are defl ated entities. But there is a third aspect 
to our defl ationary approach. That aspect concerns issues about epis-
temology and explanation; and our inspiration this time is the work of 
Emma Borg (2004), and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2004).
The general idea that we draw upon is that the lexical semantics 
for words should not be expected to explain, all on their own, their as-
sociated psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. To give but one 
example, the semantics of ‘rich’ need not specify how much money a 
person must have in order to be rich. Still less must the semantics of 
‘rich’ address the philosophical question of whether a society with ex-
tremely rich people and extremely poor ones can be just. In a similar 
vein, there will be aspects of the use of ‘I’, and of ‘I’-users, that needn’t 
be explained by the pronoun’s “mode of meaning”: think here of the 
peculiarities of self-knowledge, or the conditions for the persistence of 
persons over time.
Reading in defl ation of this third sort is, we concede, a bigger ex-
egetical stretch. There is solid textual evidence in “The First Person” 
for ascribing a mere rule-of-use which, as a matter of fact, applies to 
persons. In this case, the main motivation is different, driven more 
by read-the-text-as-promising considerations. As hinted, the three de-
fl ationary moves don’t entail each other. Nonetheless, all play an es-
sential role: in that sense, they require each other. Specifi cally, given 
defl ation of the other two sorts, “explanatory defl ation” is necessary to 
account for some of Anscombe’s observations.
The exegetical stretch notwithstanding, there are some fi t-with-the-
corpus considerations that merit mention. First, it pays to remember 
that Anscombe’s general philosophical methodology is reminiscent of 
J.L. Austin’s: cautious not just in preaching but in practice; open to 
complexities and nuanced details; and comfortable with unresolved 
aporias. (Intention is an obvious, and brilliant, example.) In other work 
Anscombe at least sometimes approached philosophical problems with 
a divide-and-conquer attitude. To mention one especially notorious ex-
ample, in her “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) she holds that there 
are some issues that are properly the burden of philosophy of psychol-
ogy rather than of moral philosophy per se. Second, Anscombe was 
aware that phenomena of a similar nature arose in the absence of the 
lexical item ‘I’, e.g. in words such as ‘now’ and ‘here’. Indeed, she men-
tions Casteñeda (1967) in a footnote. Similarly, she recognized that 
the same sort of phenomena show up with third person pronouns. For 
instance, ‘Rob wanted to win, but didn’t know this’ is not made true by 
Rob wanting the 50 year-old Canadian philosopher to win, even though 
Rob was the 50 year-old Canadian philosopher in question. Anscombe 
was also keenly aware of fi rst person thoughts, which arguably are not 
to be explained wholly by features of English pronouns. Third, there is 
one clear bit of textual support for our attribution of “explanatory defl a-
tion”. Anscombe writes: “There is no objection to the topic of reidentifi -
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cation of selves—it is one of the main interests of the philosophers who 
write about selves—but this is not any part of the role of ‘I’” (52–53).
It’s worth ending this section by stressing, to avoid misunderstand-
ing, that we are not discounting Anscombe’s insights about the special-
ness of the fi rst person. We take them very seriously. It is, however, 
consistent with that to expect that something beyond the context-sen-
sitive rule-of-use for ‘I’ will help account for them.
5. Defending our Answer
This concludes our presentation of our proposed “Anscombean refer-
ence for ‘I’”. We turn more squarely now to the task of championing it. 
That requires defending it with respect to both our desiderata: the bet-
ter our reconstruction fi ts with the text, the better; and the more prom-
ising the reconstruction is qua substantive account of the phenomena 
being investigated, the better.
Applied to any reconstruction of Anscombe’s “The First Person”, this 
yields two constraints: fi rst, any putative reconstruction must comport 
with the four positive observations made by Anscombe; and second, 
any putative reconstruction must be at least initially promising and 
worthy of further investigation and development as a view about what 
we have been calling the “mode of meaning” of ‘I’. We will defend our 
account fi rst by addressing both constraints, and then by responding to 
some objections.
Let us begin with Anscombe’s four positive observations about ‘I’ 
to see how our proposed reconstruction fi ts with them. Our proposed 
rule-of-use for ‘I’—namely that if X makes assertions with ‘I’ as subject, 
then those assertions will be true if and only if the predicates used 
assertively are true of X—together with facts about what contexts of 
utterance almost always look like in our world, explains the near guar-
antee that any given use of ‘I’ will have a referent. Setting aside some 
famously puzzling cases (cf. Predelli 2005), there will almost always 
be a speaker in the context of utterance to serve as the target of the 
rule. Regarding misidentifi cation, because no referent is intended with 
a pure indexical, there’s no possibility of an error-inducing confl ict be-
tween the intended referent and what the rule-of-use specifi es.
Second, and again because of the associated rule-of-use for ‘I’, it fol-
lows that where ‘I’ is used there typically won’t be genuine doubt that 
there is a speaker. Granted, full-blown Cartesian-style immunity to 
doubt isn’t automatically ruled out by our reconstruction. Like Witt-
genstein, however, Anscombe herself was very skeptical about claims 
of infallible fi rst-person knowledge of facts. Moreover, embracing “de-
fl ated reference”, it ceases to be a task of the semantic rule for ‘I’ to 
explain entirely on its own the perplexing epistemology of self-knowl-
edge. To demand that is patently to demand too much.
Third, because there is no descriptive sense associated with ‘I’, there 
is no prediction that the output of the semantic rule associated with ‘I’ 
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must be fi xed via bodily properties, nor even via sensory ones. What 
if, qua metaphysician of mind, one wants every ‘I’-user to be bodily? 
We have no problem with such a proposal. Indeed, as noted, our pro-
posed rule-of-use is consistent with it. But our claim, again, is that 
you shouldn’t ask the lexical entry for the fi rst-person pronoun, all by 
itself, to guarantee that for you. The rule is “metaphysically silent” in 
that regard.
Fourth, and fi nally, consider in connection with the special action-
guiding nature of ‘I’ two points that lead to the same result. David Ka-
plan (1989) and John Perry (1979) have proposed that the “character” 
for a word can play an autonomous role in generating action. If they 
are correct, we can already expect ‘Rob Stainton is in danger’ and ‘I am 
in danger’ to have different behavioral proclivities because of how the 
object gets specifi ed when ‘I’, as opposed to a name, is used.7 Second, as 
explained above, for Anscombe thoughts of actions, intentions, move-
ments, etc., are unmediated and non-observational; and these features 
are central to persons in her forensic sense. So, given the defl ated ref-
erent we are proposing, there will exist a special connection between 
what a token of ‘I’ specifi es (hereabouts) and dispositions to act.
Reading Anscombe as working implicitly with a “defl ated” notion of 
reference would fi t well with her important observations about some 
philosophical peculiarities of ‘I’. Our revisionist reading has another 
advantage: it doesn’t commit Anscombe to glaringly false predictions 
about the syntactic and logico-semantic behavior of ‘I’. To explain, we 
will fi rst contrast the linguistic behavior of the expletive ‘it’ with that 
of noun phrases which exhibit a relatively “defl ated” kind of reference. 
We then show that ‘I’ obviously patterns with the latter. This makes 
our reading the more charitable of the two.
In terms of syntax, being a “dummy element” with no reference, the 
expletive pronoun ‘it’ cannot license aphonic gaps which themselves 
have a referring role. Thus consider (1):
1. * It1 seems that John is rich and [e1 allowed him to buy the house]
This sentence strikes us as full-on ungrammatical; there’s no question 
that it’s odd. The reason is not that its meaning would be peculiar: ‘It 
seems that John is rich and that fact allowed him to buy the house’ 
is a perfectly fi ne way of expressing the thought which (1) gestures 
at. Instead, the issue is that the dummy subject ‘it’ is genuinely radi-
cally non-referring—so, the expletive provides no reference-source for 
the unpronounced subject of the second conjunct. (Consider also the 
s trange-sounding ‘It1 fell to –20 degrees and e1 froze the pipes’.) Being 
radically non-referring, the expletive ‘it’ also cannot form referential 
nominal compounds:
7 In their discussions of “The First Person”, both O’Brien (1994) and Rumfi tt 
(1994: 625ff) make suggestions very roughly along these lines. O’Brien (1994: 280) 
suggests, e.g., that mastery of the rule-of-use for ‘I’ will ipso facto bring to light the 
metalinguistic fact that ‘I’ is a device of refl exive self-reference.
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2. *[It and [the cloud]] seem likely to pour rain
And ‘it’ cannot receive focal stress; nor can it appear unembedded: 
3. *It seems likely to pour rain
4. Andrew: Do you expect snow? 
 Rob: *It, it!’
Regarding logico-semantic features, the ‘it’ in question goes with zero-
place predicates: the whole raison d’être of an expletive is to serve as 
surface subject to infl ected verbs which do not take genuine arguments. 
Relatedly, sentences with expletive subjects do not license existential 
generalization. Witness the bizarreness of:
5. It is raining in Florida and it is snowing in Wisconsin. Therefore, 
there is something which is raining in Florida and snowing in 
Wisconsin
We now contrast how other “defl ated referents” work, in terms of their 
syntax and logico-semantics. We will consider two examples: ‘that rain 
storm’ and ‘his longstanding silence’. 
As a preliminary, it’s worth highlighting the respects in which these 
two count as “defl ated” by our lights. In each case, the referent lies 
closer to the “feature-placing” end of the spectrum-of-individuals as 
opposed to its “self-standing subject” end. Relatedly, it is hard to indi-
viduate rain storms and long silences, and hard to count them. Turn-
ing from the referent to the reference relation, because of the context-
sensitivity built into ‘that’ and ‘his’, in both examples the reference is 
not fi xed solely by a descriptive sense. Finally, the explanatory powers 
of rain storms and longstanding silences are comparatively impover-
ished: e.g., it offers no great insight to explain precipitation by appeal 
to a rain storm, nor quiet by appeal to a long silence. (To explain the 
italics above: we do grant that, e.g., one can explain a puddle by ap-
peal to a recent rain storm, and a baby’s successful nap by appeal to 
silence around the house. It is the relative depth and nature of the 
explanation which is at issue: in these examples, they incline towards 
the “defl ated”.)
Now, such defl ated noun phrases do license aphonic gaps which, in 
their turn, refer:
6. [T hat rain storm]1 lasted for hours and e1 was really frightening
7. Irma had a meeting with Ahmed. She called for [his longstand-
ing silence]1 [e1 to end] 
Both can serve as constituents in nominal compounds which them-
selves serve as referential-type arguments. For instance, in (8) ‘that 
rain storm’ conjoins with ‘the dog which kept barking’ to yield an argu-
ment to ‘kept Sean awake’.
8. [N P [That rain storm] and [the dog which kept barking]] kept 
Sean awake
Example (9) illustrates the same point:
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9. I am fed up with [NP [his ugly mug] and [his longstanding si-
lence]]
As a fi nal point about syntax, both ‘that rain storm’ and ‘his longstand-
ing silence’ can receive stress and appear unembedded:
10. Th at rain storm kept me awake, not the barking dog
11. That rain storm! That damned rain storm! 
12. I  can live with Ahmed’s messiness. But his longstanding silence 
drives me mad!
So much for their syntax. The logico-semantics of comparatively “de-
fl ated” noun phrases is also very different from expletives. They go 
with verbs that take genuine arguments, as illustrated already by (6), 
(10) and (12). And from these sentences one can draw valid existential 
inferences: respectively, that something lasted for hours; that some-
thing kept Andrew awake; and that something drives the speaker mad.
So much for the contrasts. As we interpret Anscombe, her view pre-
dicts that ‘I’ should pattern with ‘that rain storm’ and ‘his longstanding 
silence’, not with the ‘it’ of ‘it seems’ and ‘it’s raining’. This prediction 
is borne out. 
‘I’ licens es anaphoric gaps and ‘I ’ coordinates with patently referen-
tial nouns to form nominal compounds:
13. [I1 want [e1 to dance] or [e1 to leave]]
14. [[NP [NP John] and I] love jazz]
The fi rst person pronoun in English can readily receive stress, as in 
(15). And it can appear unembedded (in the accusative case), as in (16):
15. I  won the race, not Ahmed
16. An drew: Who wants tickets to Radiohead?
 Rob: Me, me!
Like clear cases of “defl ated” noun phrases, the fi rst person pronoun 
can also serve as argument to predicates generally, whatever their ar-
ity: ‘I smoke’, ‘Alice likes me’ and ‘Alice gave me a book’ are all perfectly 
fi ne. (Relatedly, if Irma says ‘I smoke’ and Ahmed says ‘Irma smokes’, 
they agree. Notice that this is not predicted by the ‘I’-as-expletive 
view.) Finally, comparable to (6), (10) and (12), sentences containing 
‘I’/‘me’ license existential generalization: ‘I smoke’ entails that there ex-
ists something which smokes; ‘Alice likes me’ entails that there exists 
something which Alice likes, etc.
Our brief discussion of the syntax and logico-semantics of ‘I’ shows, 
on the one hand, that our reconstruction is promising as a substantive 
account of the fi rst person pronoun’s “mode of meaning”. On the oth-
er hand, our reconstruction is exegetically superior because it avoids 
committing Anscombe to a range of obvious falsehoods about how ‘I’ 
behaves linguistically. This completes our positive defense of the re-
construction. We turn, in the next section, to objections that require 
rebuttal.
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6. Objections and Replies
We have now canvassed what we take to be an initially plausible “vari-
ety of reference” (as one might nowadays call it) that can be extracted 
from Anscombe’s “The First Person”, and we have argued that our re-
visionist reading of “The First Person” meets our two desiderata: it 
complies with Anscombe’s four positive observations, and it is indepen-
dently promising as a view about what we have been calling the “mode 
of meaning” of ‘I’. Moreover, if Anscombe was grasping for such an ac-
count of the semantic functioning (or “mode of meaning”) of ‘I’, then, far 
from having committed an egregious linguistic blunder in that famous 
paper, she was in fact anticipating ideas that remain prevalent and 
important today.
But was she? Before defending ‘Yes’ as the appropriate answer, a 
reminder about our project is in order. If we were undertaking philos-
ophy-focused history, a number of avenues of research would suggest 
themselves immediately. One could look into whether Anscombe’s cor-
respondence provides evidence of such a view, or whether marginal 
notes in the works she was reading at the time suggest it. One could 
try to trace which exact passages in her fellow Oxbridge philosophers 
might have inspired such a position on the linguistic role of ‘I’, etc.8 
Such questions—fascinating and worth pursuing—are not, however, 
our concern in the present paper. Still, a charitable and insightful 
reconstruction of the paper’s arguments and conclusions requires, at 
a minimum, two things: fi rst, internal consistency; and second, con-
sistency with the philosophical milieu in which she was working and 
writing. So let us turn to some objections that touch on these consid-
erations.
A. On ‘Referring’
The fi rst objection to our reading of “The First Person” is straightfor-
ward: our proposed interpretation simply doesn’t fi t with all the things 
Anscombe says about ‘I’ not referring. With this general observation we 
agree. But as argued in Stainton (2018), this complaint is merely ter-
minological. Anscombe’s (at that time perfectly apt) use of the vocable 
/rɛf(ə)r(ə)ns/ does not entail, even for Anscombe, that ‘I’ fails to have 
a rule-of-reference in our 21st Century sense of ‘reference’. Our claim, 
recall, is that as we in 2018 might phrase it Anscombe is merely urg-
ing that in one historically specifi c sense of ‘refer’ that she was working 
with, ‘I’ doesn’t “refer”. But it is perfectly consistent with this view that 
‘I’ can be used to “speak of” something; to “concern an object”; to “make 
an assertion about” something; and to “specify” an object”. In other 
words, on our revisionist reading ‘I’ does refer for Anscombe, at least on 
8 There is also the concern that, so far as we have been able to establish, 
Anscombe never regretted nor retracted the phraseology of “The First Person” once 
“thinner” notions of reference became more standard.
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the modern understanding of ‘refer’. (Anscombe writes: “a self can be 
thought of as what ‘I’ stands for, or indicates, without taking ‘I’ as a 
proper name” (52). This seems to endorse the idea that ‘I’ does indeed 
“refer” in our “defl ated” sense, but not in the “infl ated” way that proper 
names were assumed to.)
B. On “Missing Discussions”
A second objection. There are discussions that one would expect to fi nd 
in Anscombe’s text if our “defl ated” re-reading were correct—discus-
sions, in particular, of other kinds of “defl ated” referring which seem 
to belong in the same ballpark. Specifi cally, one would expect to fi nd 
treatments of other terms which have only a rule-of-use that requires 
no intention, such as ‘today’ and ‘here’. If she were offering a defl ation-
ary take on the “mode of meaning” of ‘I’, and if she really was concerned 
to put forward an allegedly novel variety of reference, surely she would 
have discussed similar context-sensitive words? They would be grist 
for her mill, if our interpretation were on the right track. And wouldn’t 
she address Kripke-style views of names, according to which even they 
aren’t “infl ated”?
One can’t explain away these seeming lacunae in terms of a lack 
of knowledge or a mere oversight. Anscombe was clearly aware of the 
existence of such context-sensitive items: again, she cites Castañeda 
(1967) in connection with the distinction between direct and indirect 
refl exive uses of ‘I’ and other pronouns. Similarly for names as directly 
referential: Anscombe mentions Kripke, in particular criticizing him 
for trying to recast the Cartesian argument in a way that downplays 
the centrality of ‘I’.
Our reply has to do with the central aim of “The First Person”. It 
is too seldom stressed that its objective is to rebut a neo-Cartesian se-
mantic argument for mind-body dualism. That argument contains as 
a premise, in effect, that ‘I’ has “infl ated” reference, and that this fi xes 
the nominatum as non-bodily. That is, the very fi rst paragraph of “The 
First Person” is not a mere historical preamble, but instead states the 
topic of the paper:
Descartes and St. Augustine share not only the argument Cogito ergo sum—
in Augustine Si fallor, sum—but also the corollary argument claiming to 
prove that the mind (Augustine) or, as Descartes puts it, this I, is not any 
kind of body... The fi rst-person character of Descartes’ argument means 
that each person must administer it to himself in the fi rst person; and the 
assent to St Augustine’s various propositions will equally be made, if at 
all, by appropriating them in the fi rst person. In these writers there is the 
assumption that when one says ‘I’ or ‘the mind’, one is naming something 
such that the knowledge of its existence, which is a knowledge of itself as 
thinking in all the various modes, determines what it is that is known to 
exist (45, our emphasis).
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Given this focus on ‘I’ as name-like, there is a good reason why Ans-
combe would by-pass the workings of ‘here’, ‘today’, etc. Her focus was 
rightly on how ‘I’ does not work. We are proposing a positive account of 
‘I’’s functioning, based on clues from the text. But Anscombe’s aim was 
different: it was to shut down this neo-Cartesian argument at its very 
outset. In light of this, though perhaps it would have been illuminating 
as an aside, a discussion of other terms in the same “defl ated” ballpark 
would have been just that: an aside. (Anscombe writes: “To say all this 
is to treat ‘I’ as a sort of proper name. That’s what gets us into this jam” 
(48).)
As for why she elided discussion of Kripke’s views, a fi rst point is 
that early 70s Oxbridge had simply not yet embraced his lessons about 
direct reference. In any case, Anscombe just does take proper names to 
be sense-bearing; this seems to be non-negotiable for her. What’s more, 
if Kripke were right that even names lacked descriptive senses, then 
the neo-Cartesian semantic argument couldn’t get off the ground. Thus 
Kripke, far from proving an opponent, would be offering up another 
path to the same no-sense-for-‘I’ conclusion.
Thus, whatever she may have had in mind as she wrote, it was per-
fectly reasonable for Anscombe to have avoided making positive claims 
about semantic similarities between ‘I’ on the one hand and other “pure 
indexicals” on the other. And it was perfectly reasonable for her to side-
step discussion of Kripke’s newfangled views on names.
C. On Identity Propositions
A third objection is arguably the most pressing. Recall that according 
to our revisionist interpretation of “The First Person” the fi rst-person 
pronoun ‘I’ is associated with a referent. But if that’s the case, how 
could Anscombe hold that a sentence of the form ‘I am Elizabeth Ans-
combe’ does not express an identity proposition? Worse, her infamous 
claim fi ts very well with the “Straight” reading that we are challenging: 
if ‘I’ is an expletive, then of course ‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ will not 
express an identity.
We have three replies. First, because the referent is defl ated on the 
view we are attributing to Anscombe, there isn’t the right kind of ob-
ject for an identity. Being merely a locus for feature-placing, there are 
no clear individuation conditions for the thing “spoken of”/“specifi ed” 
by ‘I’; so if genuine identity requires “robust” objects satisfying precise 
Quinean individuation conditions, then it follows that there won’t be 
person-involving identities (in that exigent sense).
Second, because the reference relation is defl ated, there are not two 
senses, each corresponding to the same object. But since Fregeans re-
quire this for an (informative) identity statement, there won’t by Ans-
combe’s lights be any such statements involving ‘I’.
Third, because of the defl ated “metaphysical and explanatory pow-
er” of ‘I’, the fi rst person pronoun on its own does not fi x or entail the 
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nature of the thing-which-asserts. In particular, it does not fi x it as 
a kind of body. In contrast, according to Anscombe the proper name 
‘Elizabeth Anscombe’, as a matter of analytic entailment, must refer 
to a certain kind of animal, namely a human, female animal. Worse 
for “real identities”, and revisiting a point from footnote 4, Anscombe’s 
view seems to be that ‘I’-users turn out to be persons in the forensic 
sense, and these are only “intimately connected” with bodies. So again, 
‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ cannot state an identity proposition in the 
relevant sense. (That Anscombe is rejecting only “identity statements” 
construed in some philosophically strict way is suggested by her ac-
knowledgement at the outset of her paper that there is a “mundane, 
practical, everyday sense” in which ‘I am Descartes’ can be true (46).)
Here is another way at our main point. Ask: why, according to Ans-
combe, is ‘Elizabeth is Anscombe’ a genuine identity statement? The 
answer is: because the referent of both ‘Elizabeth’ and ‘Anscombe’ is a 
robust, countable human body; and because there is a sense associated 
with both proper names, each yielding the same nominatum. Also, we 
have not just an intimate connection between Elizabeth and Anscombe, 
but one single thing. Now compare this with the case of ‘I’.
7. Conclusion
Many readers have taken Anscombe to hold a radical non-referring 
view about ‘I’, according to which ‘I’ is a sort of expletive pronoun. Such 
a view, however, fi ts poorly with numerous points made explicitly by 
Anscombe in her paper; it is also manifestly incorrect about both the 
surface syntax and logico-semantics of ‘I’. Fair engagement both with 
Anscombe as a founder of the Analytic tradition and with her excep-
tionally insightful paper requires us, therefore, to identify a “mode of 
meaning” for ‘I’ that coheres better with her text and with her larger 
philosophy, as well as with certain empirically obvious facts about the 
fi rst person pronoun.
With that in mind we have proposed an “Anscombean reference for 
‘I’” which is defl ated along three axes: fi rst, the reference relation does 
not involve a descriptive sense, but only a rule-of-use where intentions 
are otiose; second, the referent is a “person” in the forensic sense of that 
term; and third, the explanatory burden of “Anscombean reference” in 
epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics is fairly limited, so that 
many of the puzzling aspects of the fi rst person must be explained by 
something other than the lexical semantics of ‘I’.
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